Globalization and Imperfect Labor Market Sorting by Carl Davidson et al.
       
   research paper series 









Research Paper 2010/30 
 
Globalization and Imperfect Labor Market Sorting 
By 





















The Centre acknowledges financial support from The Leverhulme Trust            
under Programme Grant F/00 114/AM The Authors 
Carl Davidson is a Professor of economics at Michigan State University and External Research 
Fellow of GEP. 
 
Fredrik Heyman is an Associate Professor at the Research Institute of Industrial Economics, 
Sweden. 
 
Steven Matusz is a Professor of economics at Michigan State University and External Research 
Fellow of GEP. 
 
Frederik Sjoholm is a Professor at the Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Sweden and 
External Research Fellow of GEP. 
 



























We are indebted to Steven Haider, Marc Muendler, Gary Solon, Richard Upward and Jeff 
Wooldridge for helpful discussions. We have also benefitted from the feedback provided by 
seminar participants at Johns Hopkins University, Lund University, and University of Michigan 
and conference participants at the European Trade Study Group in Rome (September 2009), 
University of Nottingham GEP Conference International Trade: Firms and Workers (June 2010) 
and Comparative Analysis of Enterprise Data in London (October 2010).  
 









This paper focuses on the ability of the labor market to correctly match heterogeneous workers to 
jobs within a given industry and the role that globalization plays in that process. Using matched 
worker-firm data from Sweden, we find strong evidence that openness improves the matching 
between workers and firms in export-oriented industries. This suggests that there may be 
significant gains from globalization that have not been identified in the past – globalization may 
improve the efficiency of the matching process in the labor market. On the other hand, we find 
no evidence that openness affects the degree of matching in import-competing industries. These 
results remain unchanged after adding controls for technical change at the industry level or 
measures of domestic anti-competitive regulations and product market competition. In addition, 
we find no evidence that technical change has any impact on the degree of matching at the 
industry level. Our results are also robust to alternative measures of the degree of matching, 
openness, or the trade status of an industry. 
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This paper focuses on the ability of the labour market to correctly match heterogeneous workers to jobs 
within a given industry and the role that globalization plays in that process. Using matched worker-firm data 
from Sweden, we find strong evidence that openness improves the matching between workers and firms in 
export-oriented industries. This suggests that there may be significant gains from globalization that have 
not been identified in the past – globalization may improve the efficiency of the matching process in the 
labour market. On the other hand, we find no evidence that openness affects the degree of matching in 
import-competing industries. These results remain unchanged after adding controls for technical change at 
the industry level or measures of domestic anti-competitive regulations and product market competition.  In 
addition, we find no evidence that technical change has any impact on the degree of matching at the 
industry level. Our results are also robust to alternative measures of the degree of matching, openness, or 
the trade status of an industry.   These results are broadly consistent with the theoretical predictions of 
Davidson, Matusz and Shevchenko (JIE 2008) and Davidson and Matusz (Working Paper 2010).  These 
papers argue that the self-selection of heterogeneous firms into exporting will improve the efficiency of the 
matching process when trade costs fall and that increased import penetration may have an ambiguous 
impact on matching.  Our empirical results suggest that globalization will generate a previously unnoticed 
pure gain to countries involved in trade:  The increased access that domestic firms gain to world markets 
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A recent article in the Quad-City Times (based in Davenport, Iowa) chronicled how a wide-
variety of  local residents have been forced to take less-than-ideal jobs to survive the current recession.
1 
The stories included: a former mechanical engineer now employed as a truck driver, a computer 
programmer with 30 years of experience now working as a freelance writer, and a recent graduate with a 
degree in sports management working at Taco Bell.  These workers do not show up in any of the labor 
statistics used to measure the performance of the economy – they are not unemployed, nor are they 
discouraged workers or part-time employees, so they would not be included in any of the measures of 
“underemployment” – but their predicaments are sure signs that the economy is not operating efficiently.  
This article is not unique – it would be easy to find dozens of similar articles with a simple internet search.  
Many articles were present even before the onset of the recession.  At that point, they tended to focus on 
the role that globalization may play in destroying high tech jobs and forcing highly skilled workers to 
seek alternative employment (examples would often include x-rays being sent to India to be read and 
technical call centers recently established in foreign countries).  The concerns that are front and center in 
both types of articles are that the labor market may not be correctly assigning workers and their skills to 
tasks within the economy.  This type of labor-market mismatch is difficult to measure and the factors that 
influence the degree of imperfect matching are not well understood. This paper focuses on the ability of 
the labor market to correctly match workers to jobs within a given industry and the role that globalization 
plays in that process.          
The idea that workers with heterogeneous abilities could be mismatched with firms with 
heterogeneous skill requirements dates back to the classic paper by Becker (1973) on the marriage 
market.
2  Becker introduced the issue by pointing out that men differ in a variety of attributes including 
                                                            
1 See “Underemployment keeps many Quad-Citians heads above water,” in the Local Business section of the Quad-
Cities Times, April 11, 2010. 
2 Closely related to the matching problem described by Becker is the “assignment problem” associated with early 
models by Tinbergen (1951) and Roy (1951) (see Sattinger 1993 for a survey).  Becker is concerned with one-to-one 
matching – matching males and females in the marriage market or a single worker with a firm in the labor market.  2 
 
physical capital, intelligence, education, wealth and physical characteristics and it unclear how these men 
ought to be matched with similarly heterogeneous women.  Becker argued that under reasonable 
assumptions about the household production function that positive assortative matching – the matching of 
men and women with similar attributes – would be optimal.  Similar issues apply to the labor market 
where even in narrowly defined industries firms differ in the technologies they use, the skill-mix of 
workers they employ, and the wages that they pay (Doms, Dunne and Troske 1997) and workers differ in 
education, physical attributes and raw ability.  A large literature has developed in search theory devoted to 
finding conditions under which positive assortative matching is optimal in labor markets with two-sided 
heterogeneity and conditions under which the market outcome yields the optimal pattern of labor market 
sorting (see, for example, Shimer and Smith 2000 and Legros and Newman 2002, 2007).  In the context 
of the labor market, positive assortative matching translates into the most productive firms employing the 
most highly skilled workers.  
Davidson, Matusz, and Shevchenko (2008) provide insight into the effects that globalization 
might have on labor market mismatch.  Their model, henceforth referenced as the DMS model, consists 
of a perfectly competitive industry populated by heterogeneous firms that differ in the sophistication of 
the technology that they use and heterogeneous workers differentiated by ability.  High-ability workers 
are better suited for the jobs created by high-tech firms, so that positive assortative matching is optimal.  
However, the existence of labor market frictions implies that equilibrium sorting may be imperfect – that 
is, some high-ability workers may accept low-tech jobs if they happen to be matched with low-tech firms 
first and those firms can afford to offer a wage high enough to induce them to stop searching. As in any 
model of trade with heterogeneous firms, it is those firms that adopt the modern technology (the most 
productive firms) that have the greatest access to international markets. Changes in the degree of 
openness therefore have a disproportionate effect on the profitability of adopting the modern technology.  
As trade costs fall, the mix of firm types and the wage offers that they can afford to make are altered.  The 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Assignment models focus on firms that hire multiple workers and then must assign those workers to a variety of 
tasks.   3 
 
key predictionss are that (a) in export-oriented industries greater openness leads to better labor market 
sorting and (b) in import competing industries greater openness may increase the mismatch between 
workers and firms. Both of the results are driven by how openness affects the relative revenues earned by 
high-tech and low-tech firms.    
Our goal in this paper is to test these sharp predictions about openness and imperfect matching 
using matched worker-firm data from Sweden.  The data requirements to carry-out this exercise are 
demanding.  We need extensive information about workers, firms, and their employment relationships 
over time.  The Swedish data set is ideal for this, since it is both extensive, including roughly 50% of the 
workforce and all firms in Sweden with more than 20 employees, and rich in detail concerning worker 
characteristics, firm characteristics and employment relationships.  The data set is also characterized by 
considerable worker mobility, allowing us to avoid the issue of “limited mobility bias” that has been 
associated with previous empirical studies of assortative matching using linked employee-employer data 
(see Andrews, Gill, Schank and Upward 2008).  We construct the measure of the degree of matching in 
disaggregated industries using both observed attributes and unobserved fixed effects of workers and firms. 
The unobserved worker and firm effects are estimated using the approach taken by Abowd, Kramarz and 
Margolis (1999) and the literature that has followed.   
To identify the effect of openness on the degree of matching, we use different measures of 
openness.  Our preferred measure of openness is tariffs.  Reduction in foreign tariffs imposed on Swedish 
exports can increase the market access for Swedish firms, while reduction in Swedish tariffs imposed on 
foreign imports may intensify import competition. The main advantage of using tariffs is that they can be 
considered as exogenous after 1995 when Sweden joined the European Union. It is unlikely that a small 
country like Sweden can have any substantial impact on the level of tariffs set by the EU.  In addition, 
foreign tariffs are not affected by conditions in the Swedish industry. We are mainly interested in how 
matching has changed over time, whether openness can explain this change, and whether the effect of 
openness differs between export-oriented and import-competing industries.  4 
 
Figure 1 gives us a first glance of the Swedish data. In both plots, the degree of matching is 
measured by the correlation between worker and firm total effects (including both observed and 
unobserved attributes). In panel A, openness is measured by foreign tariffs imposed on Swedish exports. 
In panel B, openness is measured by the share of multinational sales. Over the sample period, the degree 
of matching increased steadily. At the same time, foreign tariffs were reduced and the share of 
multinational sales increased. Therefore, both plots display a strong positive correlation between openness 
and positive assortative matching. However, this positive correlation may reflect a spurious correlation 
rather than a causal effect of openness on the degree of matching. To identify the effect of openness on 
the degree of matching, we exploit the cross-industry and over-time variation in the measures of openness 
and the degree of matching. Another source of identification is based on the unique prediction of the 
DMS model that the effect of openness differs between export-oriented and import-competing industries. 
Finally, to identify the effect of openness we also control for other industry-level time-varying factors that 
may affect the degree of matching. Both Acemoglu (1999) and Albrecht and Vroman (2002) argue that 
skill-biased technical change increases the degree of positive assortative matching. Product market 
competition may also affect the profitability of firms and the degree of matching between firms and 
workers. Thus, in our investigation of the relationship between openness and positive assortative 
matching, we add industry-level controls for those factors.   
We find strong evidence that openness improves the matching between workers and firms in 
export-oriented industries. This suggests that there may be significant gains from globalization that have 
not been identified in the past – globalization may improve the efficiency of the matching process in the 
labor market. On the other hand, we find no evidence that openness affects the degree of matching in 
import-competing industries. These results remain unchanged after adding controls for technical change 
at the industry level or measures of domestic anti-competitive regulations and product market competition.  
In addition, we find no evidence that technical change has any impact on the degree of matching at the 
industry level. Our results are also robust to alternative measures of the degree of matching, openness, or 
the trade status of an industry.    5 
 
There are at least two reasons to focus on globalization’s influence over labor market sorting.  
The first has to do with the aforementioned public perception that trade-induced job displacement results 
in significant losses for some highly-skilled workers by forcing them to accept less preferred jobs. 
However, our empirical results do not provide any support for this perception. In fact, our results suggest 
that globalization creates a pure gain by improving the efficiency of matching in export-oriented 
industries without causing the matching process to deteriorate in import-competing industries. 
   The second reason to focus on the link between imperfect matching and globalization has to do 
with the recent emphasis on firm heterogeneity for a variety of trade-related issues.  Empirical findings 
generated over the past 15 years indicate that in export-oriented industries not all firms are engaged in 
exporting.  Firms that export tend to be larger, more capital intensive and pay higher wages than their 
counterparts that sell all of their output domestically.  In addition, globalization appears to exacerbate the 
degree of firm heterogeneity by reallocating market shares in favor of the highly productive firms that 
export.
3  This makes the strongest firms even stronger and the weakest firms even weaker.  It is now 
widely accepted that firm heterogeneity within a given industry is an essential component of “new, new” 
trade models. 
On the other side of the labor market it should be clear that there are significant differences across 
workers in terms of skills. For example, studies by Barro and Lee (1993, 1996, 2001) document the wide 
disparity of educational attainment within most countries.   Grossman and Maggi (2000) use data on 
literacy scores within and across countries to make the same point.  Thus, there is ample evidence that 
labor markets within narrowly defined industries are characterized by two-sided heterogeneity.  In 
addition, the empirical literature on job creation and job destruction (e.g., Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh 
1996) suggests that the labor market does not always perfectly match workers to jobs as we observe 
considerable churning even within stable industries as workers and firms severe relationships in search of 
                                                            
3 See Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2007) for an excellent survey of the work on heterogeneous firms and 
trade.  Citations to the papers that have provided these stylized facts are included in the survey. 6 
 
better matches.  As we noted earlier, the factors that influence the degree of imperfect matching in the 
labor market are not yet well understood. This is particularly true with respect to the role of globalization. 
Although there is now extensive research, both empirical and theoretical, that explores the 
implications of firm-level heterogeneity for international trade, the literature on worker heterogeneity and 
trade is far more limited and has grown more slowly.  Grossman and Maggi (2000) was one of the earliest 
contributions.  One of their main goals was to show that the distribution of talent could be a source of 
comparative advantage.  Grossman and Maggi assume that all firms within a sector are identical, so they 
are focusing on the sorting of heterogeneous workers across sectors with different production processes.  
They also assume competitive markets so that matching is always efficient – thus, the type of labor-
market mismatching that we are interested in studying cannot arise in their setting.  These same features 
can be found in the other important papers on labor market sorting and trade, including Grossman (2004), 
Yeaple (2005), Antras, Garicano and Rossi-Hansburg (2006), Kremer and Maskin (2006), Ohnsorge and 
Trefler (2007), Costinot (2009) and Costinot and Vogel (2010) – most focus on sorting across industries 
and all assume competitive labor markets.
 4   In contrast, we are interested in the affect of globalization on 
the imperfect sorting of heterogeneous workers across heterogeneous firms within the same industry. As 
far as we know, Davidson, Matusz and Shevchenko (2008) is the only theoretical paper that focuses on 
imperfect matching and trade.  Moreover, this paper offers the first empirical evidence on the role that 
globalization plays in matching workers and firms within an industry. 
In the next section, we provide a more detailed description of the DMS model and its predictions.  
We then describe one key theoretical extension designed to bridge the gap between the theory and the 
empirical work.  We also compare the mechanism that drives the results in the DMS framework to a 
similar mechanism at work in Acemoglu (1999).  In section 3 we describe the empirical approach that we 
take and discuss the data set and measurement issues.  Our empirical results are presented in Section 4.   
                                                            
4 Yeaple (2005) is an exception here – he has heterogeneous workers sorting across two types of firms with the same 
industry.  But, he assumes competitive labor markets so that sorting is optimal.  The frameworks used by Costinot 
(2009) and Costinot and Vogel (2010) are also flexible enough that they could be used to study sorting within a 
sector – but, again, they assume competitive labor markets so that sorting would always be efficient.   7 
 
2.  The Theory 
To understand the forces that drive our theoretical predictions we begin by reviewing the insights 
on trade and assortative matching from Davidson, Matusz and Shevchnko (2008).   Their model, which is 
an open-economy extension of Albrecht and Vroman (2002), allows for heterogeneity on both sides of the 
labor market.  On the supply side, there are two types of workers: high-ability and low-ability.  On the 
demand side, ex-ante identical perfectly competitive firms must adopt a technology when entering the 
market and, as in Yeaple (2005), incentives exist such that more than one technology is selected in 
equilibrium.  This gives rise to firm-heterogeneity.  There are two potential technologies that firms may 
use.  Those that select the modern technology (high-tech firms) must recruit a high-ability worker in order 
to produce; whereas those that adopt the basic technology (low-tech firms) can produce using either a 
high-ability or a low-ability worker.  Each firm employs a single worker and a variable amount of capital 
to produce its good.  The productivity of a firm is tied to the ability of its worker with high-ability 
workers more productive than their low-ability counterparts.  However, high ability workers are more 
costly to hire since they can command a higher wage.  Thus, firms that adopt the modern technology will 
be more productive and earn more revenue, but they will also incur higher labor costs.  Capital is rented 
in a spot market after the worker is hired and the rental rate is normalized to one.  In contrast, frictions in 
the labor market workers to search for jobs.  Search is random, with workers negotiating their wages once 
hired so that, as in most search models, the equilibrium wage is given by the Nash Bargaining Solution.  
Since search is costly, firms and workers may end up mismatched in that a worker may find it optimal to 
accept a less than ideal job if the expected benefit from continuing to search for a better job is lower than 
the cost of additional search.  This outcome is unique to DMS since this is the only trade paper that has 
imperfect matching. 
DMS make the usual assumptions with respect to entry in that all firms must pay a fixed cost of f 
to set-up production and incur an additional fixed cost of fx to access world markets.  The fixed cost of 
exporting implies that some firms may decide to sell all of their output domestically.  Upon entry, each 
firm selects a technology and then posts a vacancy in order to hire a worker.  The proportion of firms that 8 
 
select the basic technology and the total mass of firms producing are determined by free entry conditions.  
We follow DMS and use  to denote the proportion of vacancies that are unfilled and tied to low-tech 
firms in the steady state equilibrium.  The value of   summarizes what we need to know about the mix of 
open jobs at any point in time and it is determined by free entry and steady state conditions.  We are 
interested in equilibria of the DMS model in which  1 0     so that the market is characterized by both 
firm and worker heterogeneity.  In addition, we focus on the case in which the parameters of the model 
are such that high-ability workers are better matched when employed by high-tech firms.  This implies 
that positive assortative matching is optimal – that is, we prefer to have high-ability workers matched 
with high-tech firms.   
There are two types of equilibria in this model depending on whether high-ability workers are 
willing to accept low-tech jobs.  If they are willing to do so, then we have what Albrecht and Vroman 
(2002) call a Cross-Skill-Matching (CSM) equilibrium in which some high-ability workers are 
underemployed (or mismatched) in equilibrium  -- that is, there is imperfect sorting in the labor market.  
While these workers are better suited for high-tech employment, they accept low-tech jobs if they happen 
to match with low-tech firms first and if low-tech firms can afford to pay a wage high enough to induce 
these workers to stop searching.  This can occur if the revenues earned by the two types of firms are 
sufficiently close to each other.   
In the other type of equilibrium, high-ability workers search until they find high-tech jobs.  This 
type of equilibrium, which Albrecht and Vroman refer to as an Ex-Post Segmentation equilibrium, exists 
if the revenues earned by the two types of firms are sufficiently different so that low-tech firms cannot 
afford to pay high ability workers a wage high enough to induce them to stop searching. 
The model is summarized in Figure 2.  Firms that enter pay the fixed cost of entry, select a 
technology and post a vacancy.  Unemployed workers are then randomly matched with firms with 
vacancies.  If the firm and the worker can agree on a wage, the firm rents capital and production takes 
place. Production continues until the match breaks-up, which occurs at a constant rate.  Once the job is 9 
 
destroyed, the partners start searching again for a new match.  If the firm can increase profit by exporting 
some of its output, it pays the fixed cost of exporting and sells its goods on the world market at the world 
price of p
*.  Alternatively, firms can sell some or all of their output in the domestic market where the price 
is p.   
There are three types of firms that may be observed in equilibrium: high-tech firms matched with 
high-ability workers (type H); low-tech firms matched with low-ability workers (type L); and low-tech 
firms matched with high-ability workers.  If we use M to denote the measure of the last type of firm, then 
M  > 0 in a Cross-Skill Matching equilibrium and M = 0 in an Ex-Post Segmentation equilibrium.  Firms 
enter until the expected profit from creating a high-tech vacancy or a low-tech vacancy are driven to zero; 
and, since both values are driven to zero, in equilibrium firms are indifferent about the type of vacancy 
they create.  Low-ability workers are only offered low-tech jobs and they always accept them.  High-
ability workers accept a low-tech job if the wage offered exceeds their expected value from continuing to 
search for a high-tech job.  One feature of the model that is worth highlighting concerns the wage 
structure.  If we use wi to denote the wage paid by a type i firm, we first note that wH > wM.  This follows 
from the fact that high-ability workers are more productive when employed by high-tech firms.  Second, 
since high-ability workers employed by low-tech firms have better outside opportunities than their low-
ability counterparts, they can demand a higher wage from low-tech firms – thus, wM > wL. 
As in other models with heterogeneous firms (e.g., Melitz 2003; Yeaple 2005; Bernard et al 2003) 
the most productive firm (in our case, high-tech firms) enjoy the strongest incentive to export while the 
least productive firms (in our case, low-tech firms matched with low-ability workers) have the weakest 
incentives to do so.   The implication is that as trade costs fall, the most productive firms expand at the 
expense of the least productive firms – that is, market shares are reallocated in favor of high-tech firms.  
For our purposes, the main insights from DMS are that (1) openness affects relative revenues earned by 
the high-tech and low-tech firms and (2) the manner in which relative revenues are affected depends on 
the industry’s trade position.  In export markets, increasing openness makes it easier for all firms to sell 
their goods on world markets, where the world price exceeds the domestic price.  And, since high-tech 10 
 
firms have greater incentive to export than low-tech firms and since they employ the most productive 
workers in the industry, openness increases the spread between the revenues earned by the two types of 
firms.  As a result, as markets become more open, low-tech firms will have a harder time attracting and 
retaining high-skilled workers.  The implication is that if the economy begins in a Cross-Skill Matching 
equilibrium, increased openness can destroy it by making it impossible for low-tech firms to attract high-
ability workers.  Alternatively, if the economy remains in a Cross-Skill Matching equilibrium, the 
frequency with which workers and firms are mismatched declines as openness increases.   
Tracing through the forces that drive these results provides insight into how the model works.  As 
trade costs fall, type H firms take advantage by producing more output and exporting a greater share of 
their production.  This increases the surplus to be split between the high-tech firms and their workers, 
resulting in an increase in wH.  The increase in wH implies that the outside opportunities for all high-
ability workers have improved and this triggers an increase in wM.  The increase in wM may be large 
enough that it makes it unprofitable for low-tech firms to hire these workers.  If so, the Cross-Skill 
Matching equilibrium is destroyed.  If the Cross-Skill Matching equilibrium remains intact, then the 
increase in wM reduces the expected profits for low-tech firms resulting in some exit by these firms.  In 
addition, the fall in trade costs induces entry by new high-tech firms.  As a result of the market’s 
restructuring, fewer high-ability workers wind up employed by low-tech firms. 
To summarize, this model yields a rather sharp prediction about how match quality ought to be 
linked to openness in export-oriented markets.  As markets become more open, high-ability workers 
should be more likely to match with high-tech firms, whereas a higher fraction of low-tech firms should 
be matched with low-ability workers.  Thus, in export markets an increase in openness should lead to a 
more efficient allocation of talent in the labor market.  This could be viewed as a new (potentially 
important) gain from trade. 
The DMS predictions are reversed for import-competing industries.  In these industries, 
globalization leads to a reduction in the market price p, as new, lower-priced substitute goods are 
imported from world markets.  This lowers the revenues earned by all domestic firms and shrinks the gap 11 
 
between the revenues earned by low-tech and high-tech firms, making it easier for low-tech firms to 
attract and retain highly-skilled workers.  The implication is that if the economy begins in an Ex Post 
Segmentation equilibrium, increased openness can cause the economy to switch to a Cross-Skill 
Matching equilibrium as low-tech firms suddenly find that it is possible to attract high-ability workers.  
Alternatively, if the economy starts in a Cross-Skill Matching equilibrium, the frequency with which 
workers and firms are mismatched will increase as openness increases.  As a result, greater openness 
ought to lead to an increase in the average quality of the workers hired by low-tech firms.  Once again, we 
have a rather sharp prediction about the link between openness and the efficiency of the labor market:  in 
import-competing industries an increase in openness should lead to a less efficient allocation of talent in 
the labor market.  This could be viewed as a new cost of globalization. 
In order to test these predictions, there are some limitations of the DMS model that need to be 
considered.  To begin with, the assumption of perfect competition in the product market is inconsistent 
with intra-industry trade.  In reality, increased openness due to (for example) a reduction in trade costs 
would result in more export opportunities as well as more intense import competition in any particular 
industry.  The model can be extended to allow for intra-industry trade by assuming that the product 
market is characterized by monopolistic competition.  The extension is straight-forward (see Davidson 
and Matusz 2010), and it leads to a small, but significant new insight.  As trade costs fall, exporting 
increases and it is still the most productive firms that gain the most – as a result, the gap between the 
revenues earned by the high-tech and low-tech firms still rise so that, eventually, the low-tech firms will 
find it impossible to attract high-ability workers.  In other words, as trade costs fall, the impact of greater 
domestic export activity leads to better matching.  This is the same prediction generated by the perfectly 
competitive framework. 
However, the reduction in trade costs also leads to greater import penetration and it is here that 
the insights from the perfectly competitive model become a bit muddled.  To see this, note that under 
perfect competition all output produced domestically is sold in the home market.  As import penetration 
drives down the domestic price, the gap between the revenues earned by the low-and high tech firms 12 
 
shrinks because the revenue gap is tied directly to the difference in their production levels (qH – qL where 
qi is the output of a typical type i firm).  This is not the case under monopolistic competition, since even 
in import-competing industries the best firms will typically export only a fraction of their output.  Under 
monopolistic competition, the gap in the revenues earned by the two types of firms is tied to the 
difference between the output levels offered for sale in the domestic market by the two types of firms – 
while high-tech firms produce more output, they sell a smaller fraction of their output in the domestic 
market.  Thus, as trade costs fall, the impact of increased import competition on the quality of matching is 
unclear. This difference in the predictions of the two models is important, because, as we will see in 
Section 4, our empirical results do not support the DMS hypothesis that increased openness leads to less 
efficient matching in import-competing industries. 
We close this section with a brief discussion of Acemoglu (1999), the work that is most closely 
related to ours.  Acemoglu presents a closed-economy model in which high-skilled and low-skilled 
workers search across (possibly) heterogeneous firms for jobs.  He shows that two types of equilibria can 
exist.  In the first, some firms create high-tech jobs and match only with high-skilled workers while other 
firms create low-tech jobs and match only with low-skilled workers.  This separating equilibrium is quite 
is similar to the EPS equilibrium in our model.  In the other equilibrium, all firms create the same type of 
jobs and match with both types of workers.  Since all firms adopt the same strategy, this as a pooling 
equilibrium.  Acemoglu refers to the jobs associated with the pooling equilibrium as “middling” and 
shows that middling jobs will be offered only when the relative productivity of high-skilled versus low-
skilled workers is not too great; otherwise, equilibrium entails separation.  Thus, skill-biased technical 
change, which widens the gap between the workers’ productivities, can move the economy from a 
separating equilibrium to a pooling equilibrium.
5  When this happens, high-skilled workers gain and low-
skilled workers are harmed.  In the latter part of his paper, Acemoglu offers a variety of evidence that in 
                                                            
5 See Albrecht and Vroman (2002) for a similar argument.   13 
 
many industries middling jobs have been disappearing and have been replaced by the type of jobs that 
would be offered in a separating equilibrium.
6 
  If we apply the logic presented in this paper to Acemoglu’s model, the conclusion is that 
openness should cause middling jobs to disappear in export-oriented industries and appear in import-
competing industries.  This follows from the fact that exporting increases the spread between the revenues 
that the two types of workers can generate, just like skill-biased technical change in Acemoglu’s 
framework, while import competition decreases this spread.  In his empirical analysis, Acemoglu does not 
separate his industries into groups based on their trade status.  Our model suggests that doing so might 
allow for a direct test of our model’s prediction that openness can alter the nature of the labor-market 
equilibrium.  That is the issue that we take up in the next two sections of this paper. 
3. Empirical Specification, Data and Measurement 
The DMS model predicts that openness improves matching in export-oriented industries, but may 
reduce the degree of positive assortative matching in import-competing industries. To examine these 
theoretical predictions, we use the following specification: 
        01 2 _ gt gt g gt t g gt Matching Openness Export oriented Openness D D                         (1) 
where  g indexes industries; t indexes years;  gt Matching   represents the degree of matching between 
workers and firms;  gt Openness   measures the degree of openness;  g oriented Export _   is a dummy 
variable equal to one if industry g is export oriented, zero otherwise;
7  t D  and  g D  represent year and 
industry fixed effects; and  gt   is the error term that includes all of the unobserved factors that may affect 
the degree of matching. The year fixed effects control for the omitted macroeconomic factors that may 
                                                            
6 Thus, Acemoglu’s work provides a theoretical explanation of the polarization of the labor market that has recently 
been documented for the US, UK and Europe by Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006), Goos and Manning (2007) and 
Goos, Manning and Salomons (2009), respectively. 
7 Details about the measurement of the degree of matching, openness, and the trade status of an industry will be 
given in the section on data and measurement. 14 
 
affect the degree of matching. The industry fixed effects may capture the cross-industry difference in the 
degree of matching as a result of differences in production technology across industries. Because 
specification (1) controls for both year and industry fixed effects, identification of the openness effect on 
matching relies on cross-industry and over-time variation in the degree of matching and openness. The 
additional source of identification comes from ߙଶ which indicates the difference in the effect of openness 
between export-oriented and import-competing industries. The DMS model predicts that ߙଶ should be 
significantly positive. This sharp prediction about how the effect of openness should vary systematically 
across industries by trade status can help us to separate the effect of openness on the degree of matching 
from the effect of other factors, e.g., skill-biased technical change, because the impact of those factors on 
the degree of matching does not differ systematically between export-oriented and import-competing 
industries. 
Our main coefficients of interest are ߙଵ and ߙଶ. The effect of openness on the degree of matching 
for import-competing industries is captured by ߙଵ, and the effect of openness for export-oriented 
industries is captured by ߙଵ ൅ߙ ଶ. If the effect of openness is negative for import-competing industries, 
but positive for export-oriented industries, we expect that ߙଵ is significantly negative, and ߙଵ ൅ߙ ଶ is 
significantly positive. 
A.  Data Sources 
We use a matched employer-employee database with detailed information on Swedish firms and 
establishments linked with a large sample of individuals for the period 1995-2005.
8  The data on 
individual workers contain wage statistics based on Statistics Sweden’s annual salary surveys and are 
supplemented by material from a series of other data registers. The dataset covers more than two million 
individuals (accounting for roughly 50% of the labor force) and includes information on workers 
                                                            
8 There are at least two major advantages to using the period 1995-2005. Firstly, the firm data set includes the whole 
population of firms (previous years include only a sample of the smaller firms). Secondly, Sweden joined the EU in 
1995 and changes in tariffs can then be considered exogenous. 15 
 
experience, education, occupation, sector, and demographics.  The plant-level data add establishment 
information on the composition of the labor force with respect to educational level and demographics.
9   
Firm data are based on Statistics Sweden’s financial statistics, covering all Swedish firms and 
containing variables such as productivity, investments, capital stock, number of employees, the wage bill, 
value added, profits, sales, a foreign ownership dummy, multinational status, and industry affiliation. See 
Table A1 in the appendix for a description of the variables. 
B.  Measuring the Degree of Matching 
Measuring the degree of matching between workers and firms is a daunting task. Although the 
matched employee-employer dataset contains rich information about workers and firms, both workers and 
firms still have unobserved attributes that may have an impact on the degree of matching. In fact, 
previous studies on assortative matching (e.g., Goux and Maurin, 1999; Abowd et al., 2002; Andrews et 
al., 2006) focus on the correlation between unobserved firm and worker effects. Our objective, however, 
is to examine if “good” workers tend to work for “good” firms. The quality of firms and workers should 
include both observed and unobserved aspects. Thus, unlike the previous literature on assortative 
matching, we measure the degree of matching based on both observed and unobserved worker and firm 
attributes. The other important deviation from the literature is that we construct the measure for each 
industry and each year. 
To obtain estimates of unobserved worker and firm attributes, we run the following wage 
regression: 
(, ) , (, ) ln h t h t h jht t jht t h t wx Z                                                                 (2) 
where ln ht w  is the log wage of worker h at time t,    , j ht  is worker h’s employer at time t,  ht x  is a 
vector of observable time-varying worker characteristics,  h   is the worker fixed effect,  (, ) , j ht t Z  is a vector 
of observable time-varying firm characteristics,  (, ) J ht   is the firm fixed effect,  t   is the year fixed effect, 
                                                            
9 The plant-level data are aggregated to the firm level. In the following, we only use ‘firms.’ 16 
 
and  ht   is the error term. Equation (2) is a three-way fixed effects model which extends the Abowd et al. 
(1999) specification by adding firm-specific time-varying variables.  
To avoid possible bias arising from differences in the number of work hours, the dependent 
variable is measured as full-time equivalent wages.
10  Time-varying worker characteristics include 
experience squared, higher-degree polynomials of experience, and a dummy variable for blue-collar 
occupations.
11 Since education is time invariant, it is subsumed in the worker fixed effects. Time-varying 
firm characteristics include capital intensity, firm size (number of employees), labor productivity (value 
added per worker), share of high-skill workers (i.e., share of the labor force with at least 3 years of post- 
secondary education), manufacturing indicator, share of female workers and its interaction with the 
manufacturing indicator. Note that the omission of observed firm attributes or unobserved firm effects 
from the wage regression can cause omitted variable bias in the estimation of the returns to worker 
abilities.      
There are several estimation issues surrounding specification (2). Our Swedish data for 1995-
2005 consist of around 10 million individual-year observations. Computer memory restraints preclude 
using the least-square dummy variable (LSDV) approach to estimate a model with millions of individual 
effects and thousands of firm effects. To solve this problem we use a memory saving algorithm to 
estimate three-way fixed effect models in Stata (see Cornelissen, 2006; Andrews el al., 2006). We include 
firm dummies and sweep out the worker effects by the within transformation. Firm effects are identified 
from workers who move between firms over the period. Non-movers add nothing to the estimation of the 
firm effects so the firm effect will not be identified for firms with no movers. Worker effects are 
estimated from repeated observations per worker, implying that the data must include a sufficient number 
of both multiple observations of workers and movers of individuals across firms. This approach, labeled 
                                                            
10  The wages for female workers who take a maternity leave are reported as the same as prior to their maternity 
leave. 
11 In our sample experience is constructed as age minus number of years of schooling minus seven. Because the 
years of schooling rarely change in the sample, with both individual and year fixed effects included, experience 
varies directly with the year fixed effects, that is, the impact of experience on wages is captured by the year fixed 
effects. Therefore, experience is excluded from equation (2).  17 
 
as FEiLSDVj
12 by Andrews et al. (2006), gives the same solution as the LSDV estimator and allows us to 
recover the individual and firm specific effects ( h   and  (, ) J ht  ).  
Since identification of worker and firm effects relies on the mobility of workers across firms, 
increasing the number of observations per worker and the number of movers per firm provides more 
precise estimates. The median number of observations per worker is in our sample is four (see Table A3 
in the Appendix).  Almost one third of our firms have more than 51 movers; the median value of movers 
is above 30; and only 3 percent of the firms have no movers (see Table A4 in the Appendix). This 
mobility is high compared to many previous studies and brings the advantage of getting all firms, except 
the 3 percent with no movers, into the same grouping: meaning that they are connected by worker 
mobility. For the period 1995-2005, the mover group consists of over 9.45 million person-year 
observations and 8,465 unique firms. The group of firms with no movers only consists of 1,917 person-
year observations and 309 unique firms. This is important since the correlation coefficient between firm 
and person effects can only be estimated within groups (see e.g. Cornelissen, 2006; Cornelissen and 
Hubler 2007). In addition, the high level of mobility in the Swedish data allows us to avoid limited 
mobility bias, which tends to lead zero or negative correlation coefficients (see Andrews, Gill, Schank 
and Upward 2008). We follow Cornelissen and Hubler (2007) and only include workers that are observed 
in at least two periods and firms that have at least five movers. 
Results from the individual wage regressions for the period 1995-2005 are presented in Table 1. 
Column 1 reports the simple ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates in which both firm and worker fixed 
effects are excluded. As expected, more experienced workers earn higher wages, but the return to 
experience has a declining rate. Blue-collar workers earn lower wages than white-collar workers. 
Moreover, larger firms, more productive and capital intensive firms, and firms with a bigger share of 
more skilled workers pay higher wage premiums.  
                                                            
12 The abbreviation stands for Fixed Effect for individual i combined with LSDV for firm j. We use the program 
felsdvreg (see Cornelissen 2006), which is a memory saving algorithm to estimate FEiLSDVj in Stata. 18 
 
Column 2 displays the estimates of the three-way fixed effect model in equation (2). The 
coefficient on the dummy variable for blue-collar occupations remains negative, although the magnitude 
of the coefficient is greatly reduced after controlling for unobserved worker fixed effects. Similar to the 
OLS estimates, bigger firms, firms with higher productivity and a higher share of skilled workers pay 
higher wages. However, in contrast to the result in column 1, the estimated coefficient on capital intensity 
turns negative after controlling for firm effects. The capital intensity variable only picks up variation 
within each firm over time since we have firm fixed effects.  Since employment is easier to adjust than the 
capital stock, one possible explanation for the negative coefficient on capital intensity is that firms shed 
workers and restrain wages when hit by a bad shock.  In this case, higher capital intensity is associated 
with lower wages. In addition, the estimates in column 2 suggest that in the manufacturing sector firms 
with a higher share of female workers pay a lower wage. Overall, the results of the wage regression seem 
reasonable. 
Based on the estimates of equation (2) as reported in column 2 of Table 1, we compute the 
measure of human capital based on both observed worker abilities ( ht x  ) and unobserved worker 
attributes ( h  ). Workers with higher human capital level are considered as more skilled. At the same time, 
firms that pay a higher wage premium (i.e. higher (, ) (, ) j ht jht Z    ) are considered as good firms. Table 2 
reports the correlation between firm and person effects. In order to compare our estimates with the prior 
literature, we also calculate the correlation only between unobserved firm and worker effects ( h   and 
(, ) J ht  ). The estimated correlation of unobserved effects ranges between 0.03 and 0.06 depending on 
specification. This positive correlation is in contrast with the surprising finding of no or even negative 
correlations in many other studies (Goux and Maurin, 1999; Abowd et al., 2002; Barth and Dale-Olsen, 
2003; Gruetter and Lalive, 2004; Andrews et al., 2006; Cornelissen and Hubler 2007). However, our 
figures are close to the correlation of 0.08 found for France in the study by Abowd et al. (1999). They are 
also in line with the study by Andrews el al. (2008) who analyze how sensitive the correlation is to the 19 
 
share of movers in the data. They report a positive correlation when they study movers in high turnover 
plants.  
Our main interest is the correlation between both observable and unobservable firm and worker 
characteristics ( (, ) (, ) j ht jht Z     and  ht h x    ). As shown in Table 2, the correlation coefficients 
computed based on both observed and unobserved attributes are relatively large, mostly around 0.10. 
Again, we have positive assortative matching when workers with high skills tend to work in relatively 
good firms. 
As mentioned above, the results might be biased if there are few observations per worker or few 
movers per firm. We therefore make several robustness estimations where we include different samples of 
firms and workers. Restricting our sample to workers with more observations reduces the correlation 
coefficient for unobservable characteristics: from 0.066 in the whole sample, to 0.048 when each worker 
has to be observed at least two periods, and to 0.032 when they have to be observed for at least 3 periods. 
The decline in the coefficient is relatively large but does not alter the qualitative results of positive 
assortative matching. The same pattern is not found for the correlation coefficient of both unobservable 
and observable characteristics: the coefficient shows a marginal decline from 0.108 for the whole sample 
to 0.104 when each worker is observed at least two periods; and to 0.102 when workers are observed at 
least three periods.  
The results are robust to the exclusion of firms with few movers. In particular, for the correlation 
coefficient based on both observable and unobservable characteristics, it rises from 0.108 for the whole 
sample to 0.110 when firms with below five movers are excluded. 
Our preferred sample includes workers with at least 2 observations and firms with at least 5 
movers. When applying these restrictions, the correlation between unobservables is estimated to be 0.048 
and the correlation between the total of observable and unobservable firm and worker characteristics is 
estimated to be 0.105. 
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C.  Measuring Openness  
We use several measures of openness at the industry level in order to capture different aspects of 
openness to trade and other international economic activities. We do not use firm-level measures of 
openness to avoid the endogeneity problem. 
Our preferred measure of openness is tariffs. Reduction in foreign tariffs imposed on Swedish 
exports can increase the market access for Swedish firms, while reduction in Swedish tariffs imposed on 
foreign imports may intensify import competition. The main advantage of using tariffs is that they can be 
considered as exogenous after 1995 when Sweden joined the European Union. It is unlikely that a small 
country like Sweden can have any substantial impact on the level of tariffs set by the EU. In addition, 
foreign tariffs are not affected by conditions in the Swedish industry. Data on tariffs (at the six-digit HS) 
are from the UNCTAD TRAINS database. This classification is then aggregated up to the three-digit level 
of SNI (Swedish Industrial Classification) using trade shares as weights. Specifically, to construct the 
industry-level foreign tariffs, the shares of Swedish exports in 1995 (the first year of the sample) are used 
as weights. For the industry-level Swedish tariffs on foreign goods, the shares of Swedish imports in 1995 
are used as weights.  
  Our second industry-level measure of openness is the production share of multinational firms 
(both foreign and Swedish owned) in total production (measured in sales). Foreign owned multinational 
firms are defined as firms with above 50 percent foreign ownership and Swedish multinational firms are 
defined as Swedish owned firms with affiliates abroad. This variable can capture the degree of 
outsourcing and offshoring, which is another important aspect of openness. 
  All measures imply that openness has increased between 1995 and 2005. The share of 
multinational firms in sales has increased from about 47 percent to 55 percent. There has also been a 




D.  Defining the Trade Orientation of an Industry 
We define an industry as export oriented if the industry has net exports in the initial period of the 
sample, and an industry as import competing if the industry has net imports in the initial period of the 
sample. According to this definition, export-oriented industries include the Manufacture of pulp, paper 
and paperboard; Manufacture of motor vehicles; Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals 
and botanical products; Manufacture of other special purpose machinery, etc. This list of export-oriented 
industries clearly indicates that Sweden has the comparative advantage in high-tech products as well as 
wood related products (related to its natural endowments). On the other hand, import-competing 
industries include the Manufacture of wearing apparel and accessories; Manufacture of footwear; 
Manufacture of rubber products; Manufacture of basic chemicals, etc. 
 As robustness checks, we define the trade orientation of an industry based on the average of net 
exports across years. An industry is defined as export oriented if it has a positive average of net exports 
over the sample period. Another alternative definition is based on positive or negative net exports across 
years. An industry is considered as export oriented if it has more years with positive net exports than with 
negative net exports over the sample period. These three alternative measures of trade status are highly 
correlated – 90% of the industries have consistent definitions of trade status based on these alternative 
measures. Moreover, we experiment with a continuous measure of trade status by calculating the value of 
net exports as a share of total trade (imports plus exports). 
4.  Empirical Results on Openness and Matching 
A.  Baseline estimates 
Table 3 reports the estimation results for equation (1). All regressions include industry and year 
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the 3-digit SNI industry level. An industry is considered as 
export oriented if the industry had positive net exports in 1995. Column 1 reports the results when 
openness is measured by foreign tariffs on Swedish exports. Note that the tariff data are transformed so 
that more openness means lower tariffs. The estimated coefficient on openness is negative, but 22 
 
statistically insignificant. This suggests that for import-competing industries, reduced foreign tariffs have 
no significant effect on the degree of matching. The estimated coefficient on the interaction term is 0.022 
with a standard error of 0.007, indicating that the effect of reduced foreign tariffs on the degree of 
matching is significantly different between import-competing and export-oriented industries. In particular, 
the estimates in column 1 suggest that for export-oriented industries, reduced foreign tariffs significantly 
improve the degree of matching. This result provides strong support for the DMS model. Reduced foreign 
tariffs can improve the opportunity for Swedish firms to enter or expand their presence in foreign markets. 
As the DMS model suggests, good firms in export-oriented industries will benefit more from the 
increased access to world markets and will hire more highly-skilled workers. On the other hand, weak 
firms in export-oriented industries will become less able to attract highly-skilled workers. As a result, the 
degree of positive assortative matching increases in export-oriented industries.   
Column 2 of Table 3 displays the results when openness is measured by Swedish tariffs imposed 
on foreign goods. Again, the tariff data are transformed so that greater openness means reduced Swedish 
tariffs. Unlike the estimates in column 1, we find no significant effect of openness on the degree of 
matching for either import-competing or export-oriented industries. One possible explanation for this 
weak result is that reduced Swedish tariffs can have opposing effects on Swedish firms within an industry. 
On the one hand, reduced Swedish tariffs on foreign imports may intensify import competition to 
Swedish producers of the goods that directly compete with foreign imports. On the other hand, lower 
Swedish tariffs may benefit Swedish producers who use the imported goods as an intermediate input. 
Since our industry-level analysis pools both types of producers, we cannot distinguish the different impact 
of reduced Swedish tariffs on different types of producers within an industry. 
In column 3 we measure openness using the share of sales by multinational firms. An increased 
share of multinational sales may indicate increased economic activities related to outsourcing or 
offshoring. Thus, this measure of openness helps to capture another aspect of increasing economic 
integration. The estimates in column 3 show that increased share of multinational sales weakly reduce the 
degree of matching for import-competing industries. Consistent with the result in column 1, the estimated 23 
 
coefficient on the interaction term is statistically significant and positive. The results suggest that the 
effect of increased sales by multinational firms on the degree of matching is significantly positive for 
export-oriented industries. In column 4 we include an additional five industries that do not have tariff data 
available. The results are little changed. 
Overall, we find strong evidence that greater openness improves the degree of positive assortative 
matching for export-oriented industries, which supports the theoretical prediction of the DMS model. On 
the other hand, we find no strong evidence that more openness has any significant effect on the degree of 
matching for import competing industries.  This is also broadly consistent with the extension of the DMS 
model that allows for monopolistic competition in the product market.  As discussed earlier, the impact of 
openness on the efficiency of matching in import-competing industries is ambiguous in that framework.    
B.  Skill-based Technical Change 
In Acemoglu (1999) and Albrecht and Vroman (2002) search models are developed in which 
skill-biased technical change increases the degree of positive assortative matching.  However, since their 
models do not allow for trade, an industry’s trade status plays no role in their analyses. In order to 
separate the effect of openness from the effect of technical change on the degree of matching, we add 
several industry-level measures of technical change as controls, which include the share of investment in 
computing and communication equipment, R&D expenditures per employee, annual growth rate in capital 
stock, and annual growth rate in capital intensity. The results are given in Table 4. Columns 1-5 report the 
estimates when openness is measured by foreign tariffs. Columns 6-10 report the results when openness is 
measured by the share of multinational sales. The table shows that none of the measures have any 
significant impact on the degree of matching. On the other hand, our estimates of the effect of openness 
remain unchanged. 
C.  Domestic deregulations and product market competition 
There were no major reforms during the period we are looking at. However, the shift of domestic 
market competition may coincide with the change in openness to trade and foreign investment during the 24 
 
sample period. It is possible that increased or reduced domestic market competition can affect the 
profitability of high-tech and low-tech firms and further affect what types of workers they want to hire. In 
order to disentangle the effect of domestic market competition on the degree of matching from the effect 
of openness, we add measures of domestic deregulations and product market competition as controls. The 
estimates are shown in Table 5. 
The regulatory indicator captures the amount of anti-competitive regulations at the two-digit 
industry level and is constructed by the OECD. A higher value of the index indicates a higher degree of 
regulations. Both columns 1 and 3 show that more anti-competitive regulations lead to a higher degree of 
positive assortative matching. This may indicate that high-tech firms benefit more from anti-competitive 
regulations and hire more highly-skilled workers. On the other hand, our results for the effect of openness 
remain unchanged.  
We also construct a measure of product market competition at the two-digit industry level by 
following Boone (2008) and Boone et al. (2007). A higher value of the measure indicates more 
competition. The results reported in columns 2 and 4 indicate that this measure has no significant effect 
on the degree of matching. Again, our results for the effect of openness are unchanged. 
D.  Alternative measures of the degree of matching, openness, and the trade status of an industry   
We now examine the robustness of our baseline results to alternative measures of the degree of 
matching, openness, and the trade status of an industry. The results are displayed in Table 6.  
In the baseline estimation the degree of matching is measured as the correlation between firm and 
worker total effects. In rows 1 and 9 we use an alternative measure of positive assortative matching by 
correlating the firm total effects with the worker total effects averaged across all workers employed in the 
firm. In rows 2 and 10 we replace the measure by a correlation between the firm total effects with the 
median worker total effects for all workers employed in the firms. Both alternative measures generate 
fairly similar results for the effect of openness on the degree of matching. The estimates suggest that more 
openness (measured as reduced foreign tariffs in panel A and as increased share of multinational sales in 25 
 
panel B) significantly increase the degree of positive assortative matching for export-oriented industries, 
but weakly reduce the degree of matching for import-competing industries. Thus, these results are 
consistent with our baseline estimates.  
All the measures of the degree of matching reported so far are constructed using the estimates of 
the wage regression specified in equation (2). The benefit of this approach is that we can correlate both 
observed and unobserved firm and worker attributes. However, if the sample period is short, the estimated 
worker unobserved effects may have finite sample bias. In addition, identification of firm unobserved 
effects relies on wages of movers only, which could generate bias in the estimates of firm unobserved 
effects. Given these possible limitations, we also construct the measure of the degree of matching based 
on observed worker and firm attributes. Specifically, we measure worker skills by education, which is 
classified at seven different levels (see Table A1 in the Appendix for details). We measure firm types 
using capital intensity. More capital intensive firms tend to use more sophisticated technology and thus 
we treat them as high-tech firms. Rows 3 and 11 report the results when the degree of matching is 
measured as a correlation between worker education levels and firm capital intensity. Again, we find 
strong evidence that increased openness (reduced foreign tariffs or an increased share of multinational 
sales) significantly improves the degree of positive assortative matching for the export-oriented industries. 
In rows 5 and 13 we replace the contemporaneous measures of openness with those at a one-year 
lag. The key results remain unchanged. 
We then estimate the effect of openness on positive assortative matching using alternative 
definitions of the trade status of an industry. In rows 5 and 12 an industry is defined as export oriented if 
the industry has a positive average of net exports over the sample period. In rows 6 and 13 an industry is 
defined as export oriented if the industry has more years with positive net exports than with negative net 
exports. As mentioned in the data section, 90% of industries have consistent trade status based on these 
alternative measures. Thus, it is no surprise that the estimates based on these alternative definitions of 
trade status are very close to the baseline estimates reported in Table 3. In rows 7 and 14 we use a 26 
 
continuous measure of trade orientation by calculating a ratio of net exports to total trade (exports plus 
imports). Again, the baseline results carry through. 
Overall, Table 6 shows that our key result remains unchanged when alternative measures of the 
degree of matching, openness, and trade status are used: increased openness increases the degree of 
matching for export-oriented industries. 
E.  First-difference specification 
The regressions reported in Table 3 fully exploit information for each year over the sample period. 
In order to examine whether the estimates shown in Table 3 can also capture the long-term relationship 
between openness and matching, we take a simple 10-year difference of the data and look at the 
relationship between the change in openness and the change in the degree of matching across 74 SNI 
industries for 1995-2005. The results are shown in Table 7. As shown in column 1, a negative coefficient 
on the change in foreign tariffs suggests that a reduction in foreign tariffs reduces the degree of matching 
for import-competing industries. The estimated coefficient on the interaction between trade status of an 
industry and openness is significantly positive and the magnitude is substantially larger than that in the 
first row, which suggests that reduced foreign tariffs significantly improve matching for export-oriented 
industries. Moreover, column 2 shows that the degree of matching is not affected by reduced Swedish 
tariffs. Finally, column 3 confirms our previous results that there is a positive effect on the degree of 
matching from the presence of multinational firms in export oriented industries.  
5.  Conclusion 
 
  As far as we know, this is the first empirical paper to investigate the impact of globalization on 
the efficiency of matching between heterogeneous firms and heterogeneous workers within industries.  
Using matched worker-firm data from Sweden, we find strong evidence that increased openness improves 
the matching process in export-oriented industries while having no significant effect on matching in 
import-competing industries.  These results are quite robust, holding for alternative measures of our key 
variables and persisting when we control for technical change at the industry level, domestic anti-27 
 
competitive regulations and product market competition.  These results are broadly consistent with the 
theoretical predictions of Davidson, Matusz and Shevchenko (2008) and Davidson and Matusz (2010).  
These papers argue that the self-selection of heterogeneous firms into exporting will improve the 
efficiency of the matching process when trade costs fall and that increased import penetration may have 
an ambiguous impact on matching.  Our empirical results suggest that globalization will generate a 
previously unnoticed pure gain to countries involved in trade:  The increased access that domestic firms 
gain to world markets will lead to better matching in the labor market without increased import 
penetration causing a countervailing loss. 
  Our empirical methodology is based on Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999). Recent extensions 
and modifications of that approach suggest at least two additional robustness checks that we intend to 
explore in the next version of this paper.  The AKM wage regression includes worker and firm fixed 
effects aimed at ranking workers and firms in terms of their productivities.  Woodcock (2008a, b) adds a 
match effect to the wage equation and argues that this effect is a key determinant of earnings dispersion.  
He argues that “specifications that omit match effects substantially over-estimate the returns to experience, 
attribute too much variation to personal heterogeneity, and underestimate the extent to which good 
workers sort into employment at good firms.”  Computational limitations make it impossible to add match 
effects to our wage regression when using our preferred data set.  In the future, we intend to check for the 
robustness of our results to the inclusion of match effects in randomly selected sub-samples of our data.  
Our second extension will be in response to the recent criticism of the AKM approach by Lopes 
de Melo (2009).  He considers a model with on-the-job search, very much in the spirit of Shimer and 
Smith (2000), and argues that while wages will be monotonically increasing in a worker’s human capital, 
they may be non-monotonically related to firm productivity.   The reason for this is that stronger firms 
will be in a better bargaining position with weak workers and maybe able to pay such workers lower 
wages than other weaker firms.  The implication is that while the worker effect that is generated by the 
AKM wage regression can be used to rank workers, the firm effect may generate an incorrect ranking of 
firms.  Lopes de Melo’s primary goal is to explain why previous empirical work using the AKM approach 28 
 
has failed to find evidence of positive assortative matching in the labor market.  He argues that this may 
be due to the inability of the AKM approach to generate firm effects that correctly rank the firms in terms 
of their productivities.  He suggests an alternative test for positive assortative matching by correlating 
worker effects with the average effects of co-workers.  While this may be an appropriate alternative 
method to test for positive sorting, it is unclear whether this approach can be used to examine the change 
in the degree of matching between workers and firms.  This is a theoretical issue that we are currently 
examining and, if appropriate, future versions of this paper we include Lopes de Melo measures of 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Variable definitions 
Industry variables 
 
Matching Correlation    Correlation between total firm and total person effects 
MNE share of production  Share of MNEs in total production (sales). 
Foreign tariffs      Tariffs on Swedish export by country of destination, weighted by Swedish export shares in 1995. 
Swedish tariffs                 Swedish (EU) tariffs on products by country of origin, weighted by Swedish imports shares in 1995. 
ICT investments    Capital compensation for computing and communications equipment as a share of total capital compensation 
R&D  intensity    R&D  expenditures in constant SEK 
Growth in capital    Percentage growth in capital stock 
Growth in capital intensity  Percentage growth in capital intensity 
 
Firm variables 
Capital Intensity    Net property, plant and equipment)/employees (in million SEK). 
Share of females    Number of women/employees 
Firm size      Number of employees 
Share high skilled    Number of high skilled workers with at least 3 years of post- secondary education)/employees 
Labor productivity    Value added/employees 
  
Individual variables    
Wage                  Monthly full-time equivalent salary, including wage, bonus, payment for overtime and work at unsocial hours 
Experience      Age minus number of years of schooling minus seven. 
Education 1       1 if highest level of education is elementary school (<9 years), 0 otherwise  
Education 2      1 if highest level of education is compulsory school (9 years), 0 otherwise  
Education 3      1 if highest level of education is 2 years of upper secondary school, 0 otherwise  
Education 4       1 if highest level of education is 3 years of upper secondary school, 0 otherwise  
Education 5      1 if highest level of education is 4 years of upper secondary school, 0 otherwise  
Education 6      1 if highest level of education is undergraduate or graduate college education, 0 otherwise  
Education 7      1 if highest level of education is doctoral degree, 0 otherwise 
 34 
 
Table A2 . Descriptive statistics. 
 
  Total sample  Total sample with trade  Net importer  Net exporter 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Dependent variable           
Correlation  total  effects  0.1047  0.0000 0.0713 0.0000 0.0995 0.0000 0.0242 0.0000 
           
Individual level 
variables 
         
Wage  19817.09  1.3703  20054.32 1.3557  19219.87 1.3618  20629.97 1.3470 
Experience  22.9418  12.3142 23.5457 12.1163 24.2768 12.2644 23.0591 11.9920 
Experience^2  677.9647  599.3728 701.2014 604.7058 739.7786 619.6069 675.528  593.1934 
Blue  collar  0.4885  0.4999 0.6036 0.4892 0.5954 0.4908 0.6090 0.4880 
           
Firm level variables           
Capital  intensity  0.1533  5.4254 0.2626 3.5909 0.1789 3.4622 0.3392 3.4473 
Share  of  females  0.3537  0.2231 0.2722 0.1397 0.3151 0.1390 0.2437 0.1327 
Share  of  high  educated  0.2500  0.1949 0.2281 0.1589 0.2077 0.1522 0.2418 0.1618 
Size  1370.73  5.6497 1307.27  4.9540 852.35 4.8086 1737.84  4.7394 
Labor  productivity  0.4893  1.9211 0.5149 2.1667 0.4097 2.1596 0.5995 0.9412 
           
Industry level variables           
MNE  share  0.5149  0.3317 0.6662 0.2873 0.6404 0.2892 0.7005 0.2814 
Foreign  tariffs  1.7454  9.6652 1.7473 9.6702 2.5969 12.7201  0.6201 0.9286 
Swedish  tariffs  0.8291  1.1722 0.8291 1.1722 1.1675 1.4116 0.3803 0.4496 
ICT  investments  0.2451  0.1985 0.2093 0.2144 0.2197 0.2420 0.1955 0.1705 
R&D  intensity  60617.8 95092.34 63593.79 97821.15 60313.97 102557  68380.32 90393.63 
Growth  in  capital  0.1326  0.5000 0.0827 0.4123 0.0704 0.3619 0.0991 0.4707 
Growth in capital 
intensity 
0.4756  1.8925 0.3254 1.1682 0.3356 1.1957 0.3118 1.1322 
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Table A3. Number of observations per person. Based 
on estimations on the period 1995-2005. 
   Obs. per  
     pers.     Freq.         Percent     Cum. 
          1     466,007       22.28       22.28 
          2     298,793       14.28       36.56 
          3     237,687       11.36       47.92 
          4     195,895        9.36       57.29 
          5     175,474        8.39       65.68 
          6     148,201        7.08       72.76 
          7     122,099        5.84       78.60 
          8     105,038        5.02       83.62 
          9     107,184        5.12       88.74 
         10     123,388        5.90       94.64 
         11     112,119        5.36      100.00 
      Total   2,091,885    100.00 
 
 
Table A4. Number of movers per firm. Based 
on estimations on the period 1995-2005. 
Movers per 
firm              Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
          0            309          3.52        3.52 
      1-  5        1,574        17.93       21.45 
      6- 10          645          7.35       28.79 
     11- 20         914        10.41       39.20 
     21- 30         623          7.10       46.30 
     31- 50         833          9.49       55.79 
    51- 100     1,122        12.78       68.56 
       >100      2,760        31.44      100.00 
      Total       8,780      100.00 
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Tables and Figures 
Figure 1. Assortative matching and openness 
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Table 1. Individual Worker Wage Regressions 1995-2005  
OLS   LSDVreg 
(1)   (2) 
Experience 0,0243   
 (0.0001)***   
Experience^2/100 -0,0798  -0,001 
 (0.0009)***  (0.0000)*** 
Experience^3/1000 0,0108  0,0012 
 (0.0003)***  (0.0002)*** 
Expereience^4/10000 0,0007  -0,0006 
 (0.0000)***  (0.0000)*** 
Blue collar  -0,1909  -0,0273 
 (0.0002)***  (0.0003)*** 
Female -0,1394   
 (0.0002)***   
Capital intensity  0,0494  -0,0028 
 (0.0002)***  (0.0001)*** 
Size 0,0003  0,0049 
 (0.0000)***  (0.0001)*** 
Labor productivity  0,0494  0,0067 
 (0.0002)***  (0.0001)*** 
Share of high skill  0,3376  0,0739 
 (0.0006)***  (0.0012)*** 
Manufacturing 0,0214  0,0506 
 (0.0003)***  (0.0011)*** 
Share of women  -0,1266  0,1297 
 (0.0005)***  (0.0016)*** 
Manufacturing*share of women  0,0327  -0,1705 
 (0.0009)***  (0.0029)*** 
Time dummies  Yes  Yes 
Individual fixed effect  No  Yes 
Firm fixed effect  No  Yes 
Number of observations  9 452 970  9 452 970 
R-square 0,4075       




Table 2 Correlations Between Firm and Worker Attributes 1995-1995 
  Correlation between firm and 
worker unobservable effects 
Correlation between firm 
and workers total effects 
 
Whole sample:  0,0655 0,1076 
Workers observed at least 2 
periods 
0,0477 0,1038 
Workers observed at least 3 
periods 
0,0316 0,1017 
Firms with at least 2 movers  0,0658  0,1082 
Firms with at least 5 movers  0,0664  0,1095 
Workers with at least 3 
observations and firms with at 
least 5 movers 
0,0318 0,1022 
 
Preferred sample:    
  
Workers with at least 2 
observations and firms with at 
least 5 movers 
0,0481 0,1047 
Note: The whole sample consists of 9,450,919 observations, and the preferred sample has 
8,977,269 observations.  
 
 





share MNE  share 
     
     (extended 
sample) 
(1)  (2)    (3)     (4) 
Openness   -0.001  0.018  -0.0695*   -0.0542 
(0.002) (0.015)  (0.0401)   (0.0409) 
Export_oriented*Openness 0.022***  0.008  0.2870**   0.2868*** 
(0.007) (0.022)  (0.1208)   (0.1184) 
Observations 860  860  860   915 
R-squared (within)  0.057  0.052  0.079   0.092 
Number of industries  88    88    88     93 
Notes: In all the regressions the dependent variable is the degree of matching measured as the correlation between 
firm and person total effects by industry and year. Industry and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors 
reported in parentheses are clustered by industries. An industry is defined as export oriented if this industry has 
positive net export for 1995. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 40 
 
Table 4. Controlling for technology change at the industry level  
Foreign tariffs     MNE share 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)      (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Openness  -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 -0.011 -0.001   -0,0535  -0.0718* -0,0543  -0,0549  -0.0726* 
(0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)    (0.0404)  (0.0427) (0.041) (0.0407) -0,0428 
Export_oriented*Openness  0.023*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.022***   0.2855** 0.3734*** 0.2872** 0.2883*** 0.3735*** 
(0.007) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)    (0.1187)  (0.1066) (0.119) (0.1186) -0,1071 
ICT investments  -0,0139     -0,0233   -0,0346        -0,0206 
(0.0336)    (0.0337)   (0.0349)        (0.0325) 
R&D intensity  0,0003     0,0003     0,0003      0,0003 
(0.0002)    (0.0002)     (0.0002)      (0.0002) 
Growth in capital  0,0074  -0,0004       -0,0008  -0,0025 
(0.0062)  (0.0032)       (0.0038)    (0.0031) 
Growth in capital intensity   0,0068  0,0059         -0,002  0,0061 
 (0.0043)  (0.0045)         (0.0049)  (0.0046) 
Observations  860 816  855 855 816    915 816 915 912 816 
R-squared (within)  0,06 0,07  0,06 0,05 0,07    0,09 0,11 0,09 0,09  0,1082 
Number of industries  88 84  88 88 84      93 84 93 93 84 
Note: ICT investments is the share of ICT in total investments. R&D is expenditures per employee. Growth in capital and capital intensity 
are annual growth rates.  41 
 
Table 5. Controlling for domestic deregulations and product market competition 
Foreign tariffs  MNE share 
  
Openness -0.001  -0.001  -0,059  -0.0863** 
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.0411)  (0.0399) 
Export_oriented*Openness 0.018***  0.020***  0.2677**  0.3879*** 
(0.007)  (0.008)  (0.1082)  (0.1064) 
Regulatory Impact Indicator  11.1211**   10.9665**   
(5.336)    (5.317)   
Product Market Competition  0,0035 0,0037 
(0.0027) (0.0025) 
Observations 860  769  860  769 
R-squared 0,0727  0,0739  0,0941  0,1158 
Number of industries  88  77   88  77 
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Table 6 Robustness 
Openness  Export_oriented*Openness      R-squared 
(within) 
  
Coeff.  Std Err    Coeff.  Std Err    Observations #  industries 
A. Openness is measured by foreign tariffs 
Alternative measure of matching 
(1)  Firm effect and average worker effect  -0.011* 0,006  0.084***  0,027  860 0,039  88 
(2)  Firm effect and median worker effect  -0.010*  0,006  0.089***  0,019  860  0,033  88 
(3)  Schooling and capital intensity  -0.001  0,002  0.018**  0,008  860  0,047  88 
Alternative measure of openness 
(4)  Openness at a 1-year lag  -0.005*** (0.0016)  0.037*** (0.0055)  766 0,083  87 
Alternative measure of trade status 
(5) Net_exporter2  -0.001  (0.0014)  0.024***  (0.0067)  860  0,059  88 
(6) Net_exporter3  -0.001  (0.0014)  0.024***  (0.0066)  860  0,059  88 
(7) Net_exporter4  0.014***  (0.003)  0.035***  (0.0073)  860 0,065  88 
B. Openess is measured by MNE shares 
Alternative measure of matching 
(8)  Firm effect and average worker effect  -0,1852  0,224  0.8709*  0,444  860  0,049 88 
(9)  Firm effect and median worker effect  -0.5481**  0,265  1.1003**  0,464  860  0,052 88 
(10)  Schooling and capital intensity  0,0329  0,026  0.2018**  0,095  860  0,085 88 
Alternative measure of openness 
(11)  Openness at a 1-year lag  -0,0157 (0.0315)  0.256***  (0.0905)  766 0,091 87 
Alternative measure of trade status 
(12) Net_exporter2  -0.0727*  (0.0368)  0.3614***  (0.1008)  860  0,092 88 
(13) Net_exporter3  -0,0675  (0.042)  0.2605**  (0.1173)  860  0,075 88 
(14) Net_exporter4     0,0699 (0.0579)    0.3570**  (0.1587)   860  0,073 88 
Notes: Industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. In rows 5 and 12 an industry is defined as export oriented if this industry has a positive average of net 
exports over the period 1995-2005. In rows 6 and 13 an industry is defined as export oriented if it has more years with positive net exports than with negative net exports. 
In rows 7 and 14 a continues variable on export orientation is constructed as: net exports/(exports+imports). Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered by 
industries. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7 Openness and assortative matching: First-difference regressions for 1995-
2005 
(1) (2)  (3) 
Foreign tariffs  Swedish tariffs  MNE share 
Openness 0,018 0,0018  -0,0923 
(0.022) (0.0273)  (0.1401) 
Export oriented*Openness -0.0635***  0,0489  0.5017** 
(0.0238) (0.0601)  (0.199) 
Export_oriented -0.1334**  -0,0017  -0,0801 
(0.0569) (0.087)  (0.0516) 
Observations 74  74  74 
R-squared 0,111  0,022  0,083 
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is a 10 year difference of the degree of matching, 
measured as the correlation between firm and person effects. Standard errors reported in 
parentheses are clustered by industries. An industry is defined as export oriented if this industry 
has positive net export for 1995.  
 
 